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ABSTRACT: This study is based on the recent vision that the innovative 
activity is a territorial phenomenon which is enhanced by the cooperation 
between actors and local infrastructures. The aim of this study is to determine 
whether the specific economic and institutional conditions of a region have an 
influence on the results of a national policy intended to support entrepreneurial 
innovation. The analysis is directed towards comparing the effect of this policy 
between firms located in Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque country, regions 
which concentrate around 70% of Spain’s innovative activity. The type of 
analysis undertaken allows to approach a situation which lies close to solving 
two of the most important methodological problems which arise when the 
evaluation of innovation policies is put into practice: the lack of control over the 
aid distribution process, and the non-estimation of a counterfactual state (the 
scenario without public support). The results of this study allow to conclude that 
the region plays an important differentiating role in the final result of the 
national innovation policy. Therefore, this study recommends to include the 
localization of the firm in future evaluations. 
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Throughout the last two decades special interest has been paid to the study of the 
factors that determine the geographical location of innovative business 
operations. Such attention has cropped up as a result of the appearance of 
industrial clusters and competitive trade regions that have given birth to the 
notion that innovative activity is a partially territorial phenomenon, boosted by 
the cooperation between local actors and the difficulty to transfer specific 
resources (Cooke et al., 2000; Tödtling and Kaufman, 2001; Asheim et al., 
2003). This idea is supported by abundant empirical evidence which reveals that 
the factors identified by the theory as relevant for technological change to take 
place, such as, the infrastructures, the nature of relations between businesses, 
learning ability and innovative activity, significantly differ from one region to 
another (Oughton et al. 2002). 
 
The acceptance of such ideas caused a strong impact on innovation policies. The 
combination of the regional level and the characteristics of the firms is 
becoming the basis on which the design of the political intervention is funded 
(Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2002). Some programmes which have been launched 
in Europe kept in mind the regional level1 and some national governments have 
started to adapt their policies to local requirements (Clarysse and Muldur, 2001). 
Such actions have many advantages: regions that have developed the appropriate 
administrative mechanisms to support the entrepreneurial innovation, eventually 
develop into regions of economic interest which take advantage of the links and 
synergies among their local actors (Cook, 2003).  
 
In this context, national policy remains a protagonist. In many industrialised 
countries innovation policies are formulated by the central government. 
However, regional differences regarding innovative activity reveal according to 
Holbrook and Salazar (2003), that the national policy does not affect all regions 
in equal terms. Given that economic convergence of regions with different levels 
of technological development is not easy (Clarysse and Muldur, 2001), for some 
authors a successful national innovation policy should be focussed on the 
regional dimension as the key aspect in the process of technological change 
(Storper, 1995; Scott, 1996; Cooke et al., 1997; Dohse, 2000). 
 
                                                 
1 Examples of such programmes are the RITTS (Regional Innovation Infrastructures and 
Technology Transfer Strategies) and the RTP (Regional Technology Plans). 
 




Although there are practically no comparative studies on the effect of national 
innovation policies in a regional context, there is no doubt that the existence of 
differences offers a great opportunity to justify changes in the distribution of 
such policies. Therefore, the regional dimension becomes a key factor in the 
evaluation of national innovation policies.  
 
This work offers for the fist time an empirical evidence that should allow to 
determine if the specific economic and institutional conditions of a region have 
an influence on the results of a national policy intended to support the 
entrepreneurial innovation. This study assesses the distribution and the effect of 
the national subsidies to innovation on the firms’ R&D intensity (Total R&D 
expenditures/Sales*100) of firms located in different regions. Concretely, firms 
located in the autonomous regions of Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque 
Country, regions which concentrate 70.5% of the innovative activity of Spanish 
firms (COTEC, 2003). 
 
The analysis of both the distribution and the effect was undertaken by means of 
a method based on the assessment of non-experimental treatments, Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM), recently applied in the evaluation of political 
interventions. The PSM helps to a certain extent to deal with two significant 
aspects of the evaluation process: the control over the process of subsidy 
distribution and the estimation of a counterfactual state. Concern about such 
aspects is derived from the recent attention shown in the literature with regard to 
specific problems faced by policy evaluation, namely, sample selection bias and 
endogeneity. It is a well known fact, that the aid distribution is a non random 
process. The participation of firms in aid programmes is determined by 
Government’s decision to concede the support and, implicitly, by the decision of 
firms to participate. This converts public financing in an endogenous variable 
which must be explained. Therefore, its inclusion within a regression model 
could cause inconsistent estimates (Busom, 2000). In addition, there could also 
exist a distortion in the selection process derived either from the government 
pressure to support successful firms or from the ability developed by some firms 
to capture a large number of grants (Lerner, 1999; Wallsten, 2000; Heijs, 2003). 
 
In general, empirical studies that deal with the effect of subsidies in relation to 
the innovative effort of firms are using regression models. Based on such 
models, a positive correlation between subsidies and firms’ R&D may be 
established.  However, Wallsten (2000) points out that it is impossible to 
determine whether subsidies induce more R&D expense, or whether the firms 
that invest more in R&D are those that are receiving the subsidies. This 
emphasises that it is not only necessary to control the problem of endogeneity, 




but also that the effect of the subsidy policy must be isolated from other possible 
causes that could explain an autonomous evolution of such investment or 
innovative effort (Arvanitis, 2002). Notwithstanding the method used, 
researchers agree that the estimation of the “causal” effect of subsidies on 
innovation, requires comparing the effect of the policy with the situation in 
absence of such a policy (Papaconstantinou and Polt, 1997). Therefore, this 
situation or counterfactual state should be estimated. 
 
The PSM allows to obtain non biased estimations of a causal effect by 
comparing the target variable (in this case R&D Intensity) of the units exposed 
to a treatment or factual state with the units not exposed to a treatment or 
counterfactual state. The PSM has recently been applied to the evaluation of the 
innovation policy in the German and in the French case (Czarnitzki and Fier, 
2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Duguet, 2003). In contrast to other studies, 
this analysis includes aspects that have never been considered previously in the 
literature on policy evaluation. Such aspects are related to the strategic activity 
of firms, their investment capacity, their difficulty to obtain innovation resources 
and the market conditions in which they operate. The wide selection of variables 
of this study could contribute to a better understanding of the factors which 
influence the distribution of aid and their possible relationship with the final 
outcome of the policy.  
 
This study is structured as follows: the second section describes the 
methodology, the data and the variables. A discussion concerning the results of 
the empirical analysis is presented in the third section. And finally, section four 
offers the conclusions drawn. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
2.1 Methodology 
Following the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the method of Propensity 
Score Matching has been widely used in the evaluation of political interventions, 
especially those concerning the labour market (Lechner, 1999; Heckman et al.; 
1999; Dehejia and Wahbam, 2002). By means of the PSM it is possible to 
identify the causal effect of a binary treatment (T). In studies where the 
assignment of units to a treatment is non random, the PSM allows to make non 
biased estimations of (τ ) − the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), by 
comparing the result variable (Y) of the units exposed to a treatment or factual 




state (Y1) with the units not exposed to a treatment or counter factual state (Y0). 
Thus τ is defined as:  
 
E(τ ) = E( Y1i| Ti = 1) – E( Y0i | Ti = 1)    [1] 
 
Because a unit (i) cannot simultaneously be observed in both states, the 
counterfactual state is estimated by means of a control group. The PSM is used 
in this study to estimate the average effect of innovation subsidies (T) on the 
firms’ R&D intensity (Y). 
 
The PMS is especially useful in non-experimental studies where the treated units 
differ systematically from the units of the control group (a problem known in 
econometric literature as sample selection bias). The PMS reduces bias by 
means of a matching method that compares units exposed to the treatment with 
units of the control group which are similar in terms of their observable 
characteristics. Due to the fact that the matching of units of many characteristics 
n in a n-dimensional vector is generally unfeasible, the method reduces the pre-
treatment characteristics of each unit into a scalar variable or propensity score 
(PS) in order to make matching more feasible2. The PS is defined as the 
conditional probability of receiving a treatment given a group of individual pre-
treatment characteristics (Xi). The Appendix gives details on the equation to 
estimate the PS. 
 
In this work the PS is defined as the conditional probability of receiving 
innovation subsidies. Therefore, the matching is made among firms that receive 
innovation subsidies with firms that do not receive subsidies, but have the same 
propensity of obtaining them (control group).  
 
Since it is hardly likely to find two units with the same PS value, it is 
appropriate to use a matching method. This analysis uses the nearest neighbour 
matching to select for each treated unit a control group unit which has the 
closest propensity score. Finally, the estimation of the causal effect requires 
compliance of a series of assumptions to ensure that the assignment to the 
treatment is random and that the counterfactual state is estimated in basis of the 
control group.  The counterfactual state of the control group must be the closest 
for subsidised firms in the case of not receiving aid (See the Appendix). 
                                                 
2 In other words, by using the PS as a matching criterion, the dimensionality problem of the 
high number of observable characteristics is reduced. 




Once these assumptions are complied, if T takes the value of 1 when an firm (i) 
receives a subsidy and 0 in the opposite case, and p(Xi) represents the propensity 
score, then the ATT (τ ) may be estimated as follows: 
 
τ  = E{E{Y1i | Ti = 1, p(Xi)} – E{Y0i | Ti = 0, p(Xi)}| Ti = 1} [2] 
 
Once the observable differences between the two groups are controlled, the only 
remaining difference is allocated to the treatment effect of the subsidies. The 
ATT may be estimated by taking the average differences. The Appendix gives 
details to derive the ATT. 
 
2.2 Data  
The data used in this study proceeds from the survey on Business Strategies 
(Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales / ESEE) prepared by the Foundation 
SEPI. We have used data of firms during the period spanning from 1998 to 
2000. The sample was limited to the innovative firms which answered the 
questionnaire during the three consecutive years, and in addition, invested in 
R&D during that period. The sample includes firms that received national 
subsidies for innovation, excluding regional or European grants. The sample 
contains a total of 1499 Spanish firms distributed as follows: 340 in Catalonia, 
298 in Madrid, 105 in the Basque Country and 756 in other regions.  
 
2.3 Variables used to estimate the propensity score 
As explained above in the methodology, the estimation of the propensity score 
(in other words, the conditional probability of receiving subsidies for 
innovation) is a preliminary step  necessary to estimate the causal effect. Up to 
the present time, the selection of variables which explain the conditional 
probability has been approached intuitively in the literature, and has only 
responded to the necessity to include equations in the models in order to reduce 
the bias derived from a non random aid distribution. Studies directed towards 
analysing the aid distribution problem and the characteristics of the subsidised 
firms are practically non existing. Of the literature up to the present, we only 
know of two: Fernández et al., (1996) and Blanes and Busom (2004). 
 
A pending task of evaluation studies is the construction of a general model 
which explains the participation of firms in support programmes. Although this 
study does not intend to derive such a model, following the related empirical 
evidence (Fernández et al., 1996; Lerner, 1999; Heijs, 1999, 2001; Busom, 




2000; Wallsten, 2000; Acosta and Modrego, 2001; Arvanitis et al., 2002; 
Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Duguet, 2003), a set of 
variables has been selected in this study in order to estimate the conditional 
probability of obtaining subsidies3. Additionally, considering that the 
methodology allows, variables which had not been previously analysed in the 
literature have been included in this study to offer information about the 
innovation policy approach and direction. These variables are related to: the 
ability to obtain resources, the possibility of a privileged relationship with 
agencies, the innovation strategy and the degree of technological dependence of 
the firm. Although most of the previous analysis have not presented any formal 
hypothesis, in this study each variable was associated to an assumption in order 
to test whether it positively or negatively influenced on the probability of 
obtaining innovation subsidies. In this context, three groups of variables were 
identified: 
 
Variables associated with the firms’ characteristics 
Size was included (log of the number of employees) and age (average age during 
the period) as indicators of experience, management capabilities and ability to 
obtain resources (Arvanitis et al., 2002; Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Almus and 
Czarnitzki, 2003). In order to control for industrial differences, the firms were 
classified as belonging to high, medium or low tech industries4. 
 
The firm ownership (percentage of capital participation) was included with the 
purpose to test whether the aid was mainly addressed to firms with foreign or 
public capital participation (Busom, 2000; Arvanitis et al., 2002; Almus and 
Czarnitzki, 2003)5. The subsidiaries of foreign companies usually see their R&D 
strategy influenced (Vaugelers,1997) and could take advantage of the 
technological developments in other countries (Busom, 2003). Due to the 
aforementioned reason, agencies are expected to discriminate against these kinds 
of firms. The public share is included in order to test for a possible privileged 
relationship with government agencies. Following the study of Lichtenberg 
(1987), we have included for the same reason, a variable that indicates whether 
the government is a customer of the subsidised firm. 
 
                                                 
3 All these studies have included equations in their models to explain the participation of firms 
in support programmes, however, it should be noted that the objective of these studies was not 
the analysis of the aid distribution problem in itself.  
4 The high tech industry was maintained as a reference. 
5 The general tendency of these studies is a stricter selection of firms with government capital 
and a smaller share of companies with foreign capital. 




Finally, we have included a variable which intends to detect possible deviations 
in the distribution of subsidies: the difficulty in funding innovation activity. 
Instruments such as subsidies are expected to be directed towards firms for 
whom financing is a barrier to innovation (Arvanitis et al., 2002). Firms who can 
develop their innovation activity in the same manner as if they had not received 
subsidies, should not be the target of aid. The variable acquires a value of 1 if 
the company had difficulties to obtain external funding for innovation, and 0 in 
the opposite case. 
 
Market related variables  
The selection of this group of variables responds to the necessity to keep in 
mind, within the framework of innovation policy evaluation models, the 
competitive environment in which the firms operate (Papaconstantinou and Polt, 
1997). A dichotomised variable was included to reveal whether the firm was 
operating within an expanding market during the period of analysis. Similar to 
other studies, we have included the export propensity (average of 
exports/average of sales * 100) within this group of variables, as a measure of 




Indicators have been introduced to test whether firms having a formal and 
articulated innovation activity are those that mainly obtain subsidies. Two 
dichotomised variables indicate whether the firm has innovation planning and 
management activities and holds technological cooperation agreements. With 
regard to the first variable, firms that plan their operations systematically and 
detail them in a plan, should be expected to find it easier to file  aid applications 
(Heijs, 2001). This variable, to a certain extent, is also a representative of the 
absorption capacity, and therefore, it is interesting to find out whether it 
increases the probability to obtain subsidies. The technological cooperation 
indicator was included in order to examine whether companies with a certain 
potential for technology transfer find it easier to access support programmes. For 
the same reason, we have also included the variable technological exports6. 
Differing from other studies, it seems important to include the variable 
technological imports as an indicator of technical dependence, as it is possible to 
deem that one of the targets of the policy is to reduce the dependence while 
favouring the internal production of innovations. 
  
                                                 
6 The variables related to the export and import of technology take value of 1 if the firm made 
or received payments for foreign technical assistance. 




In a great majority of the policy evaluation studies, the previous R&D 
experience proved to be one of the main explicatory variables of the firms’ 
participation in aid programmes (Busom, 2000; Acosta and Modrego, 2001; 
Czarnizki and Fier, 2003). In general terms, studies usually consider data 
regarding R&D expenditures of the previous year in which aid was granted or 
the number of employees involved in R&D. These variables are included in 
order to test whether agencies select firms that have a certain innovation 
experience and could, presumably, ensure the success of the subsidy projects. 
This study includes the number of patents recorded during the preceding year in 
which the aid was granted. 
 
 
3. RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In the present study we distinguish between the two types of analyses 
undertaken, namely, the estimation of the propensity score and the estimation of 
the causal effect of the policy.  Albeit the fact that the former is a preliminary 
step of the methodology, since all the variables related to the individual 
characteristics are reduced to a scalar variable, or propensity score (PS); we 
detail the PS estimation with the objective to gain a deeper knowledge of the 
variables that influence the subsidy distribution process in Spain and their 
possible relationship with the final outcome of the innovation policy. In 
addition, because the analyses are made using data from different regions, the 
study allows us to examine whether there exist differences between firms 
subsidised in a certain region compared to those subsidised in other regions. 
 
3.1 Factors that influence on the propensity to obtain innovation subsidies. 
A logit model was used in the present study to estimate the propensity of firms 
to obtain innovation subsidies (Table 1). At the national level, the main 
beneficiaries of the subsidies are: big firms with Spanish capital, exporters, 
present in expanding markets and having formal and articulated innovation 
activities. These results are in accordance to some obtained previously by the 
related empirical evidence (Fernández et al., 1996; Lerner, 1999; Heijs, 1999, 
2000; Busom, 2000; Wallsten, 2000; Acosta and Modrego, 2001; Czarnitzki and 
Fier, 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Blanes and Busom, 2004). At 
continuation follows a detailed summary of the results obtained from the 
regional analysis: 
 
• Size always had a positive and significant influence. 




• Low and medium tech industries had reduced probabilities of obtaining 
innovation aid, except in the case of Catalonia; i.e., in this autonomous 
region presumably companies belonging to any industry could probably 
obtain innovation aid. 
• In the case of the autonomous region of Madrid, having the central 
Government as a client of the firm significantly increased the probability of 
obtaining innovation subsidies. 
• In all cases, planning and managing of R&D activities had a positive and 
significant influence in order to obtain public support. 
• Technological cooperation was significant in the case of the autonomous 
region Catalonia. 
• The innovative experience significantly influenced in the autonomous region 
of Madrid.  
• Technological export had a positive and significant influence in all three 
regions.  
 
In general, we may conclude that notwithstanding the autonomous region 
involved, the Spanish firms of the manufacturing industry which have the 
highest probabilities of obtaining innovation aid are: the big firms that manage 
and plan their R&D activities. Nevertheless, regional differences were detected 
while applying for Government aid. For instance, in the case of the autonomous 
regions of Catalonia and Madrid, application for subsidies is usually more strict 
and several aspects influence, such as: the foreign capital participation, the 
market, whether the Government is a customer of the firm, the technological 
cooperation and the previous R&D experience of the firm. Stated in another 
way, we could say that in the autonomous regions of Catalonia and Madrid the 
subsidies are granted to firms that are able to warrant the technical and financial 
feasibility of the projects. On the contrary, the opposite case was found in the 
Basque Country where most technological indicators did not appear to have a 
significant influence. 
 
3.2. Effect of the innovation policy on the firms’ R&D intensity. 
Having discussed and controlled the observable differences between the two 
groups of firms, the average effect of the innovation policy on the subsidised 
firms’ innovative activities is summarised in Table 2. 
 
According to the general model, Spanish subsidised firms are on average 1.84% 
more intensive in R&D activities than the group of non subsidised firms. The 




effect of the support instruments granted by the central Government was 
significant and positive in all cases. Despite the fact that aid on average did not 
significantly increase the innovative effort, it is important to stress the absence 
of a “crowding out effect” of public funding with regard to private funding. In 
other words, firms are not generally substituting their private efforts for public 
effort. However, this study has revealed regional differences as far as the effect 
of the national innovation policy is concerned. The autonomous regions of 
Catalonia and the Basque Country showed the highest effect regarding national 
innovation subsidies, exceeding the Spanish average or general model (2.50% 
and 2.31%, respectively). On the other hand, the autonomous region of Madrid 
attained an effect (1.44%) below the Spanish average. 
 
All of the above allows us to conclude that the region causes a differentiating 
effect concerning the final outcome of the innovation policy, and therefore, it 
will be necessary to keep in mind the localisation of the firm when policy effects 
are estimated. Although in the present study the subsidy distribution process has 
been controlled, it is possible to conclude that there are three significant 
elements which characterised the regions with a higher policy effect (facing the 
rest of the regions): the firms’ location, firms operating in expanding markets, 





The purpose of this study was to analyse whether regional differences exist in 
relation to the factors that bear an influence on the firms’ chances of obtaining 
national innovation subsidies, as well as, on the effect of such a policy. The 
study included the autonomous regions of Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, together with the rest of the regions within Spain. The statistical 
analysis was undertaken using the non-parametric approach of Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM). This method allows to take into account two key aspects 
related to the evaluation of innovation policies, explicitly, the process of aid 
distribution and the estimation of the counterfactual state. 
 
The first part of the present analysis, addressed to investigate and control the 
process of aid distribution, allowed us to conclude that, in general terms, the big 
Spanish firms which plan and manage their R&D activities are the main 
beneficiaries of the subsidies. Nonetheless, regional differences were detected 
with regard to the distribution of the public aid. For instance, in the autonomous 




regions of Catalonia and Madrid, public aid is mainly granted to firms that are 
able to ensure the technical and financial feasibility of their projects. 
Technological indicators were determinant in these regions. On the contrary, the 
difficulty in funding innovation activity was not significant. A remarkable 
conclusion if one considers that one of the subsidy targets is to assist firms for 
whom funding is a barrier to undertake innovation. The subsidy distribution in 
theses regions is clearly focused on the outcome of results, denominated in the 
literature as "picking the winners". As far as the Basque Country is concerned, 
firms that resorted to this kind of aid showed less strict characteristics, since the 
number of variables that influenced on the probability of obtaining aid was 
smaller and no determinant aspects relative to the innovative experience or 
technological cooperation were detected. 
 
Respect to the policy effect, significant regional differences were identified. The 
autonomous regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country reached an average 
effect well above the Spanish average, while the autonomous region of Madrid 
did not manage to exceed the Spanish average. This study has recognised that 
there exist three significant variables which characterised the regions with a 
higher policy effect (compared to the rest of the regions): the firms’ location, 
firms operating in expanding markets, and last, firms exporting technology. 
 
The findings of this study allow to conclude that the region produces a 
differentiating effect with regard to the distribution and effect of the national 
innovation policy. Even though the purpose of this study was not to seek the 
regional elements that produce such differences, the current analysis clearly 
states that it is necessary to consider the location of firms in order to correctly 
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RESULTS OF THE LOGIT ESTIMATE 
Variables Spain    Catalonia   Madrid   Basque   
   Sig   Sig  Sig Country Sig
Size 0,571 *** 0,573 *** 0,676 ** 1,143 ** 
Medium technology industry -0,558 ** -0,638   -0,674   -1,054   
Low technology industry -0,469 ** 0,206   -1,452 * -2,099 * 
Age -0,206 * 0,083   -0,469   -0,689   
Foreign capital % -0,08 *** -0,009 * 0,000   -0,005   
Government capital % 0,016 ** ND ND 0,207   0,051   
Government is a firm’s client 0,188   -0,373   1,262 ** 2,097   
Export propensity 0,007 ** 0,003   0,015   0,020   
Expanding market 0,587 *** 0,811 ** 0,331   0,873   
Plans and manages R&D 2,376 *** 1,620 *** 3,584 *** 4,410 ** 
Technological cooperation 0,716 *** 1,316 ** -0,203   -0,663   
Difficulty to finance 
innovation 0,007   0,541   -0,616   1,379   
Patents t-1 -0,001   0,133   1,453 *** 0,107   
Exports technology 1,457 *** 2,392 *** -1,257   2,992 * 
Imports technology -0,129   0,159   0,868   0,811   
         
Log likelihood -401,6 -95144 -47966 -27954 
Pseudo R2 0,3909 0,3534 0,6100 0,5550 
Prob > chi2 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
N 1499 340 298 105 
Correctly classified (%) 86,99 87,65 93,62 86,67 
         
* p < 0.05 ** p< 0.01 *** 




AVERAGE EFFECT OF NATIONAL INNOVATION SUBSIDIES ON THE 







Firms ATT-Effect  
t-value 
Bootstrap 
Spain 1267 250 1.846 
5.874 (***) 
5.805 (***) 
Catalonia 288 55 2.507 
3.915 (***) 
3.988 (***) 




Country 75 34 2.312 
2.143 (**) 
2.194 (**) 
* p < 0.05  ** p< 0.01  *** p<0.001   
 




APPENDIX TO ESTIMATE THE PS AND THE ATT. 
 
The first step to evaluate the effect of a treatment is to calculate the 
propensity score (PS). The PS is defined as the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given a certain set of individual characteristics (Xi). A 
lineal probability model can be used to estimate the PS.  In this study we 
have applied a logit model due to its ease of use and its extended 
application in statistical analysis: 
Pr{Pi = 1 | Xi } = F(h(Xi))      [3] 
where F(.) is the function of the normal distribution, or logistical 
cumulative, and h(Xi) is a function of covariants without lineal terms of 
higher order.  
 
Once the PS is computed it is necessary to comply with a series of different 
assumptions, which constitute the basis to obtain non biased estimates of 
the average effect of a treatment on the treated:   
Assumption I.  
A set of individual characteristics (Xi) should be balanced.  In this way, 
firms with the same propensity score value p(Xi) would have the same 
distribution of individual characteristics regardless of the programme 
participation status.  Thus, the assignment to a treatment would be random 
between units (Becker and Ichino, 2002).  
T ⊥ X | p(Xi)        [4] 
Assumption II. 
A conditional Independence Assumption introduced by Rubin (1977) 
should be fulfilled, where it is assumed that the differences are captured in 
p(Xi) and the potential outcomes {Y0, Y1} are independent of the 
programme participation status.  
Y1, Y0   T  | p(Xi)       [5] ⊥
Thus, the potential outcome of the non-treated units Y0 conditioned by 
p(X), has the same distribution function as the potential outcome of the 
treated units Y0 in the case of not having received treatment. In other 
words, the counterfactual state estimated for units in receipt of treatment is 
the closest to that experienced in the case no treatment has been received.   
Assumption III. 
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption – SUTVA must be fulfilled, 
where the effect of the treatment on a given unit does not depend on the 
assignment to a treatment of other units.  In other words, under this 




assumption the result observed for a unit in receipt of treatment is 
dependent entirely on that unit (Rubin, 1978; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Angrist et al., 1996). 
 
This condition is probably fulfilled in this study, given that the innovation 
effort of a firm depends largely on its individual effort.  In the Spanish 
case, subsidies are low compared with private investment.  It was verified 
that the mean size of aid of the firms of the sample was 7.1%7.  
Furthermore, the use made by firms of subsidies received differed 
according to individual needs, and its effect depended on its appropriate 
use and management.  Nevertheless, this study includes all subsidy 
schemes currently in operation in Spain, which should reduce possible 
interference arising from firm participation in more than one programme.  
A review of the fulfilment of this condition in the case of innovation policy 
in Germany can be consulted in Almus and Czarnitzki (2003). 
 
                                                 
7 A figure which is very close to the Spanish mean of 7.2%, according to calculations 
made from data published by INE in “Estadísticas sobre Actividades de Investigación y 
Desarrollo Tecnológico 2001”.  Size of subsidy = (quantity of subsidy/R&D 
expenditure).  
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